The Two and a Half Wars India Won against China

 

Commemorative Stamp of Zorawar Singh

History is a nebulous creature, or perhaps more like a Medusa, which when one stares directly in the face, results in petrification. To that extent, it is interesting to note how the Communist Chinese narrative of one and a half wars that were won against India that was first thrown up by the murderous demagogue Mao Tse Tung to justify a sense of superiority over India.

The problem with all shades of Marxists and Maoists is that the cherry picking of history is a habit that fails even basic scrutiny. The power of narrative holds only so long as gatekeepers to information are able to secure it. Once the horses bolt the stables, it is beyond redemption, however hard they try.

If there was one and a half war for China, there were two and a half wars won by India that could be invoked to provide a cure for selective amnesia and cherry picking of history that would petrify a large section of the China apologia. History offers lessons to those who wish to learn, and it seems the Communist Chinese always learn the wrong things just to validate a false superiority.

When Skandagupta Comprehensively Defeated the Huns

It is often forgotten that the Huns would be considered an ethnicity that originated from the Steppes, and are very much called a people of China in the modern revisionist history to control regions like Inner Mongolia. If that be the case, then it is pertinent to recall the great Gupta Emperor Skandagupta who before ascending the throne of the vast Gupta empire, had given a blazing testimony to his military skills against the ‘Chinese’. And since the Hunas would doubtfully qualify as Chinese, it could be considered as a half war with China to paraphrase Chairman Mao.

There is an interesting inscription that goes by the name of Bhitari inscription, and history enthusiasts would immediately understand the reference. Located in the Bhitari village in Ghazipur district in Uttar Pradesh, the inscription carries significance for it talks about the successful repulsion of the Hunas by Skandagupta as a mark of his credentials. To quote the specific line:

By whose two arms the earth was shaken, when he, the creator (of a disturbance like that) of a terrible whirlpool, joined in close conflict with the Hûnas; . . . . . . among enemies . . . . . . arrows . . . . . . . . . . . . proclaimed . . . . . . . . . . . . just as if it were the roaring of (the river) Gangâ, making itself noticed in (their) ears.

As historian R N Dandekar had mentioned in his chronicle on the Gupta dynasty:

Skanda Gupta valiantly defended India, for a time, by defeating the Hunas and other barbarians, this remarkably glorious event being later commemorated by the erection, at Bhitari, of a ‘ pillar of victory’.

Given the odds that the Hunas had swept across the western frontiers of China and central Asia, this feat would have been considered a miracle. The  feat, which probably took place around 458 AD, witnessed the meticulous general  Skandagupta ensuring that the military strategy at hand and the choice of soldiers he deployed would change the tide of the battle and comprehensively destroy Huna power for a while, halting their attempts in his lifetime.

 

Battle of Kardung – Zorawar Singh Kahluria Routs Qin Forces

The battle of Kardung in 1841 was perhaps the first true direct confrontation between Indian and Chinese military forces, and one that has unfortunately been buried deep in the annals of history to the point of being forgotten. The admirable Dogra general Zorawar Singh Kahluria, using tactics he learnt from the conquests of Ladakh, had decided to expand the territories on the order of Maharaja Gulab Singh despite pressures from the Lahore durbar. The Qin dynasty, which had been invited by the Dalai Lama to expel the Nepali Gurkha forces, had essentially converted Tibet into a vassal state, creating military garrisons.

Alarm bells had already arisen with Zorawar Singh occupying Ladakh and marching into Tibet, having defeated Tibetan forces at several places. The Tibetan General Pi-hsi, collaborating with the forces garrisoned in Tibet by the Qin rulers, had already discovered to his horror the fall of Gartok, and immediately rallied forces to combat the marching Dogra army. To quote historian Sukhdev Singh Charak,

General Pi-hsi gathered together a large local force, took strong position at Kardung and demanded immediate reinforcements. The Tibetan Government and the Chinese Resident at Lhasa moved in the affair without any loss of time. Troops were at once mobilised. 1,000 Tibetans, “all skilled in bows and arrows”, from Central Tibet, and 1,000 additional troops from Lhasa, were sent. These troops moved to the front on August 29 and hurried off to different strategic points to prevent any further encroachment. They were ordered to cooperate with General Pi-hsi.  

The most important and the decisive battle of this campaign where General Pi-hsi lay in wait for the Dogra armies. Following a tough resistance, the Dogra army broke down the defences and the defenders were routed. In the process, the Dogra forces even captured the Mantalai standard of the Chinese Qin forces, thus becoming the ‘first victory’ against the Chinese.

While the campaign eventually saw a precipitous fall due to a combination of weather, revolt by forces and the martyrdom of Zorawar Singh in a battle, the actions were forceful enough to get the various parties playing a mini-great game – China, British, Nepal and the Lahore Durbar – to converge for the Treaty of Chushul in 1842. The Gulabnama states that the Chinese agreed that:

“as regards the boundary of the country of Ladakh including its suburbs, fixed of ancient days, we will at all have no objection and nothing to do. We will export shawl-pushm and tea according to the old tradition by way of Ladakh yearly; and if any one of Shri Maharaja Sahib Bahadur’s enemies comes to our side in our territories, we will not entertain the word of the said enemies, and will give no shelter in our country to the aforesaid men, and whatever traders will come to our territories shall meet no hinderances. Whatever we agree to in writing on the face of this contract about friendship and unity, fixing of the frontiers of Ladakh territory and the keeping open of the road for the traffic in shawl-pushm and tea, will not in the least be infringed by us.”

1967 Nathu La Battle – the Only Border Accepted by Communist Chinese

The 1967 Nathu La and Cho La battles with the People’s Liberation Army was also an event that had nearly faded out of public memory, but for some recent efforts that recall the bravery with which the 1962 humiliation was buried and the PLA forces were given a solid enough drubbing to silence them for good on the Eastern frontier.

Much as already been written, but of course, the sagacity and leadership of General Sagat Singh, who also played a pivotal role in the 1971 Bangladesh war deserve much more attention. A recent book by Probal Dasgupta has recalled the bravery with which the tide was turned at a critical moment to stun the Chinese into utter chaos, initiating a series of humiliations that they faced subsequently at the hands of Russia and Vietnam too. It must be noted that the defeat stunned the Chinese to the point that there was not even a semblance of an interference on the Eastern frontier during the 1971 war, and eventually the merger of Sikkim along with the frontier as it stands today was accepted by the Chinese as the international border eventually. This would be the second victory that the Indians can claim.

 

Therefore, if there were one and a half wars in the lexicography of Chairman Mao, there have been two and a half victories that the Indians possess over the Chinese. Revisionism in history is a ploy used to bully tactics, and this is exactly the reason that merits truth in reportage of events in a manner that lets the people decide for themselves. It is a pity that the Indians barring certain sections of the military, fail to remember these great achievements, and instead keep pulling down Indian capability to ward off and even counterattack. For reasons known best to them.